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ELLSBERG CAMBRIDGE COURSE - CAMBRIDGE HOSPITAL

*L 40 h*  
March 29, 1984

Ellsberg: The first thing I'm very happy to see (inaudible) didn't get much chance. (inaudible) Any of you here tonight care to raise an issue or question or something? There were a lot of hands up at the end. Nobody has anything, don't have anything you want to bring up. Feel free. . .from past lectures or general subjects.

Man in audience: Well, I'm eager to hear what we do about this whole thing, I'm holding my breath.

Ellsberg : One thing I was concerned about with regard to the concept of humiliation was the extent to which. . .that we had put (inaudible) was that people are willing to kill vast numbers of other people rather than be humiliated themselves. (inaudible) think (inaudible) really would be responsible for tens of thousands of Americans and Vietnamese.

To save face - was the phrase I think the paper was using a great deal.

Man : Yeah. I just am curious more about the dynamics of humiliation and that decision that thousands of other people can die so that I can save face which ethically is an extraordinary statement to make.

Ellsberg : Yeah. We were discussing the other night sort of a politically oriented model of the arms race and war which is the immediate, obvious way to approach the problem, rather than a psychological one. Apparently some people. . .have either of you been to, I know you've been to other lectures, but were you at others?

Brenman-Gibson: I've been to two.

Ellsberg: I hope nobody got the impression that what I'm presenting is the origins of the arms race or the theory of the arms race which happens to be a psychological tool. Well, as you know, last night that was an issue and

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I think that would have been clear to someone who had been at the first lecture where I really started out on the political side. But what I've been doing, more or less, since then is addressing whether or not psychological dimensions of the arms race and political behavior that are important, that is insights from psychological disciplines that would contribute here. Another thing that's suggested to me by what I was reading today, whether there are not ways of understanding individuals' behavior from psychoanalysis or psychiatry or psychology that will, at least, be suggestive of ways of understanding the political behavior of states or people in states. Now there at least three aspects of that two of which we've discussed so far. One most been discussed here, our psychological readiness to obey, and obey essentially without question, which makes bureaucratic structures capable of carrying out vastly destructive and reckless selfdestructive actions. And, since that's true on both sides of the conflict, the fact that threats are made against such structures. . . I don't think I made this point earlier. . . but, we can see such structures not only as very suitable for coercion for pressing threats in that, very destructive threats, should be regarded as credible, even if they are very (inaudible) and destructive. But by the same token, I would say bureaucracies are not, in fact, very easy to coerce. Their ability to resist pressure at the cost of one's own, an enormous cost, is in fact greater than an average individual's ability to resist this coercion. In other words, when you have the two sides threatening each other, basically, there's a high possibility that neither will back down, even though to some outsider, or if we judge them as we would judge a normal individual, we would say either should back down or withdraw from the threat.



Brenman-Gibson: Meaning it's much like the game of chicken then.

Ellsberg: It's a game of chicken with bureaucracies in the wheel and (inaudible) predict is a crash. The bureaucracy then is capable of behaving, although it's made up of humans, in a way that we find very hard to empathize with in terms of understanding, of what we think of as normal human behavior. I've had to say that in a rather complicated way because I want to make a further point that I think is important. . . . What I've said seems to contradict the possibility that you can usefully generalize, even bureauistically, from understanding individual behavior to governmental behavior. In one important sense I think that's true. We are often lead astray by doing that. There remains another possibility and that may be that our problems in understanding the governmental (inaudible) in these terms are related to inadequacies in our, at least, our set of models to draw from of individual behavior.

Brenman-Gibson: Say that again.

Ellsberg: All right. As Freud, after all, doesn't really abolish the notion of rational behavior in the limited sense in which economists think of rational behavior which is calculating, incoherent, (inaudible) behavior which may or may not be reasonable. On the contrary, he makes<sup>a</sup>/much more complex model of it. He has, to some extent. . . .he almost anthropomorphizes different parts of the personality and then takes the result as something of a committee decision or the result of a struggle, compromise or struggle, between entities that can be understood and are understood, I think, more than metaphorically as having will and purpose and interests that are perhaps rather coherent

Brenman-Gibson: You're talking about the traditional id, ego, superego.

Ellsberg: Id, ego, superego, and even elements within the id contending with each other, and so forth, elements within the superego, elements of the ego. The more it's broken down you do depart from a model of individual coherent behavior and you can get inconsistencies and reversals of various kinds and some erratic results out of this contention within the personality. But the model still is one in effect of coherent entities which are rational, in the limited economists sense, in a purposive sense, which are contending within the personality and which have, can even. . .he doesn't fully conceptualize this but psychoanalysis could easily benefit by doing that. . .having expectations, having uncertainties. . .there's very little conceptualization, for instance, of parts of the personality making gambles under uncertainty, but why not -- Acting in the presence of uncertainty, having expectations, having values -- one could easily conceptualize it in that way, probably with some benefit. The point is that what comes out as a model of the individual behavior is a good deal complex, even for "normal person" than our usual (inaudible) understanding, and even our introspective understanding of what it is to be (inaudible) different kinds of behavior and so forth. That allows the possibility then that a model behavior as complex as that in psychoanalysis or some other (inaudible) could perhaps be more fruitful in describing the complex behavior of the organizations. That's possible. It's clear that they don't behave in a very simplified way. . .of a single purpose, a single coherent purpose. Even that. . .I wanted to put what Haig would call a caveat on. . .which is. . .that, in fact, as I study this, the influence of the president, in particular, and of certain stable influences, stable



interests, is such, you really often can describe the behavior of a bureaucracy as if it were a single, purposive individual.

Brenman-Gibson: Really. Does it get that coherent, that monolithic?

Ellsberg: Without a question, but, the reason that is repudiated so often is, you can't do it on the assumption that the purposes are those that the organization proclaims. If you try to (inaudible) their behavior to what they say their interests are and their values are, you'll quickly decide, well, that has almost no relation to that. We say. . . I'll give you an example. . . Reagan (inaudible) said today that there's no problem, no contradiction between supporting the rebels in Nicaragua and the regime in El Salvador against the rebels because, he says, in both cases we are advancing democracy. Now that would be rather (inaudible) if you really tried to account for every (inaudible) in terms of supporting the people in El Salvador as conforming to his announced aim of advancing democracy unless you imagine a very peculiar definition of democracy, or of how you get. . . there are very unusual (inaudible) instrumental approach to it. There's lots of other examples. . . what I've mainly said on the on the arms race, if you take the understanding given by our government that our purpose of our arms, is to deter nuclear attack, you'll quickly decide that that has almost no relation to the kinds of weapons we buy, so people who perceive that, are then. . . simply reject the model. The other alternative, of course, is to look for different aims, hidden purposes, if you like, which after all, is what you do in psychoanalysis. So you psychoanalyze them and you say, are there covert (inaudible) repressed, kept secret because there is a guilty aspect to them because they would arouse opposition, inhibitions, and so forth. Purposes. . . which can, nevertheless, be discovered by a certain process, various processes, and tested, and then, in terms of which the behavior becomes fairly coherent and predictable and understandable. And I think undoubtedly that's true. (inaudible) So I differ from a lot of

the analysts that the current, I can call it fad (inaudible), but the current mode of analysis for the last fifteen years probably has been to emphasize the incoherence of government policy as a result of (inaudible) and so forth but I think overlooks most of what is to be learned.

Brenman-Gibson: Talking about. . .where is that, in the political psychology?

Ellsberg: No. I'm talking about political science very influenced by literally by the Kennedy School of Public Administration here, Graham Allison (?) and others.

Brenman-Gibson: You mean, psychoanalytic thing you said?

Ellsberg: No, No, political scientists have had. . .okay.

Brenman-Gibson: Oh, Okay.

Ellsberg: That's a long distraction. I'll try to avoid that because what I'm saying is. . .as I read these analyses which are apparently rather rare analyses of vindictive personalities, basically, revenge prone personalities, which I was lead to by pursuing this topic of revenge, we seem to be reading a description of government the U.S. Government. I mean I can list things here, just read here and you'd think some of it is rather astounding. You'd think that I was reading from Haig's memoirs. (laughter) It has been observed before by some people, I think Lipton probably makes this point, that in many, that there are many aspects of a paranoid personality that seem at least that they associate with certain, what they call the nuclearists or very hard-line militarists, not with government in general, but the constant alertness for attack, the belief that the world race basically is divided into oneself and enemies. You know one's allies, at least, and enemies. One dominates (inaudible) which is almost surely an explicit part of Haig's world view. . .that strength is all that counts in relationships, somehow that weakness is the ultimate sin and invites attack. So a whole



lot of that is going to describe him, a kind of suspiciousness, for example, a total lack of trust, an inability to imagine a basis for collaboration with people who are perceived as enemies. You can line that all up. . . and, I note, by the way, when these (?) a long time ago. . . 48 (?) as well, do not use the word paranoia, it may occur just once in passing one of these things in their description Kohut talks about narcissistic personalities, problems. Kohut doesn't use the word paranoid particularly. . . it suggests to me that pursuing that particular model probably is worthwhile. But this is a rather more esoteric subject since it's apparently almost never written on in psychoanalysis and that is the role of the dynamics in meaning of desire for vindication and revenge and, as I say, it seems to fit extremely well.

Brenman-Gibson: I just realized that vindication and vindictive are the same root, wow, that means the impulse is not simply toward revenge, it's to clear myself.

Ellsberg: Oh definitely, the revenge is to right, to restore a sense of self esteem, a sense of order in the universe and a sense of one's own fitness in the universe. Well, that at least is a way of interpreting it, the root suggests it, which corresponds to the notion that you are responding, not in revenge, not after all simply to a wrong, or to an action or some injury, but <sup>specifically</sup> to an injury to the self, an injury to the self esteem, an injury to pride and possibly. . . then also an injury to one's relationship to a valued whole, a larger entity, a sense of. . . Kohut describes in terms of his analysis of narcissism, it's an injury to the grandiose self, to the infantile feelings of being the superior and essentially <sup>omni</sup> potent being. . . and the other aspect of infantile narcissism the desire to be one with, it's an alternative, to an omnipotent other where the union of the self and the other is self other. It's a larger entity

Could be one with a parent but a very idealized figure who is, in turn seen as omnipotent. I suppose these two (inaudible) both (inaudible) to the early sense of one's omnipotence and then to the sense that one is not omnipotent but is potentially one with a parent who is omnipotent. Okay, anyway, it's an injury, it's an attack on this aspect of pride and. . . and of belonging. . .worthiness at belonging to a valued (inaudible).

Brenman-Gibson: You know the reason that there's so little in the literature, it occurs to me Dan, is that in order to think like this you really have to have a concept of an organized self and although in many, many, many ways, for sure, Erik has tried to do that, I think that probably because he was working entirely from clinical work of people on the couch, Kohut has really addressed this in a much more focused way and that that's the reason that he would be the one who would be talking about this. Because if you have an id, ego, superego, you know, tripod-type division like that, you don't really have a sense of an organized self and an Iness, you know. . And - an organism.

Ellsberg: Well, listen to this particular. See if you, you heard the other night my quote from Haig. You may remember. But let me read this. The various forms of narcissistic rage, (inaudible) Underlying all these emotional states is the uncompromising insistence on the perfection of the idealized self object and on the limitlessness of the power and knowledge of a grandiose self, you remember my theme yesterday was a sense of U.S. power which is very reinforced by a position after World War II but in particular by our nuclear destructive capacity which is so enormously enlarged that it's practically asking for. . .to interpret everything that we don't like in the world as a setback as an insult, as an attack and as a danger to us and a humiliation. We ought to be able to control. . .that was my theme anyway. This is now a description



of a, this type of personality, the perfection and the limitlessness of the power and knowledge of the grandiose self. The fanaticism of the need for revenge and the unending compulsion of having to square the account after an offense, I therefore. . . skip parts. . . anyway. . . are therefore not the attributes of an aggressivity which is integrated with the mature purposes of the ego. . . in fact, this isn't too bad. . . on the contrary, such bedevilment indicates that the aggression was mobilized in the service of an archaic grandiose self and that it is deployed within the framework of an archaic perception of reality. The shame-prone individual who is ready to experience set backs as narcissistic injury and to respond to them with insatiable rage, does not recognize his opponent as a center of independent initiative with whom he happens to be in (inaudible). Aggressions employed in the pursuit of maturely experienced causes are not limitless. The narcissistically injured, on the other hand, cannot rest until he has blotted out a vaguely experienced offender who dares to oppose him, to disagree with him, or to outshine him. But actually the point there that I wanted to address was this thing again. . . does not recognize his opponent as a center of independent initiative with whom he happens to be at cross purposes (?). The opponent who is the target. . . Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the fairest of them all? The grandiose exhibitionistic self is asking. And when it is told that there is someone fairer, cleverer or stronger when there is, say parenthetically, when a little pissant country would rather model themselves on Cuba for example than on America (laughter). Then like the evil stepmother in Snow White, it cannot ever find rest anymore because it cannot wipe out the evidence which is contradicted its conviction that it is unique and perfect. The opponent, who is the target of a mature aggression is experienced as

separate from ourselves whether we attack him because he blocks us in reaching our goal or hates him because he interferes with reality in the fulfillment of our reality integrated narcissistic wishes. . . (inaudible)  
The enemy, however, who calls forth the archaic rage of the narcissistically vulnerable is seen by him not as an autonomous source of impulses but as a flaw in the narcissistically perceived reality.

Brenman-Gibson: That's just unbelievable. (laughter)

Ellsberg: Now, wait, next sentence, listen to this. . . "He is a recalcitrant part--now remember that he is the observer, see, because the person we are talking about is not a person he's confronting, it's a heavy, it's a blemish in an otherwise satisfying universe--he is a recalcitrant part of an expanded self--shall we say the free world--over which he (the revengeful person) expects to exercise full control and whose mere independence or otherness is an offense." Okay.

Brenman-Gibson: Isn't this incredible? Just the opposite. Just the opposite.

Ellsberg: But, let me just remind you. . . do you remember what I'm referring to in Haig's thing here, the part. . .

Brenman-Gibson: Oh, this is too much. These should be published together somewhere. Shouldn't they?

Ellsberg: Listen. The whole theme here is. . . I didn't even read all of this so I'll just read this little bit. He said, he was in Korea, he said a few (inaudible) that were North Korean troops attacked across the 38th parallel. I didn't read this last night. "A few months later entering Seoul with elements of (inaudible), I saw evidence of Soviet military presence, down to the battalion level in the North Korean army." That's very



interesting. But I can say, I'm a student of the Korean war and have been for a long time and that's the first time I've ever heard that allegation-- that there were Soviet military advisors, at all. Military presence you might be talking about weapons, if that's true, that's a very big revelation. I think it's extremely

Brenman-Gibson: You mean, nobody's ever said that?

Ellsberg: No, it's ridiculous. Evidence. . .Soviet military presence, I don't know what he's referring to exactly, but the implication that there were Soviet advisors down at the battalion level sounds insane. I remember we were in constant conflict and not a single Soviet was captured in Korea during the entire Korean War. There was no. . .we never got any direct evidence of Soviet military presence. I happen to know the closest we ever came to the assumption that the Russians were involved directly, (inaudible) was there were suspicions based on communications that Soviet pilots were operating from Manchuria, from bases, but we never shot any down and we never captured any. So, my point here is, what I'm saying is this is not some commonplace (inaudible) we all know. This is Haig's picture of the world and, of course, the Koreans were not just ordered by the Soviet Union, which they weren't, anyway but were totally controlled. Koreans couldn't be confronting us only Russians had the power, only Russians could. . .we could only oppose Russians with dignity. Okay. The next sentence is. . ."a decade later the war in Vietnam should have taught us that such an expression of North Vietnamese could never have taken place without the massive support of the U.S.S.R. In El Salvador, no stalemate could have existed without the massive support of outside forces. So what we chose instead to tangle

ineffectively with the puppets rather than the puppetmaster." (laughter)

In other words, these little countries that we're fighting could only be puppets and that's rather frightening, the correspondence here.

Brenman-Gibson: He seemed to have been doing that a lot. . .like in Vietnam again.

Ellsberg: True. One more time, this statement here. . .does not recognize his opponent as a center of independent initiative (inaudible) which is perhaps a bit more paranoid. We do allow the existence of centers of independent initiative (inaudible) Russia has its puppets, we have our puppets. There are two centers. . .this brings in more of the paranoid aspect which he really doesn't deal with here. . .

Man: Recognizing Russia as a full other?

Ellsberg: Yeah. We recognize Russia but you see the cold war paragon there, that is to say that every disturbance of our interests that we find in the world is manipulated by the only meaningful, worthy and dignified opponent. The advantage, by the way, of. . .we were suggesting last night. . .one advantage, now I won't say it's the only one. . .is saying that every problem that we have in the world is run by the Soviet Union, our only rival in GNP and military strength. . .is that it sells a lot of weapons. But it does a lot of other things. . .(inaudible) all kinds of social preparation, organization which would hardly be justified if we were fighting El Salvador or even North Korea. So there are advantages. At any rate, it's striking to such a parallelism. Then some other things (inaudible). . .the personality he's describing which I (inaudible) has . . .one thing that I interpreted in another way the other night as being a kind of self punishing recklessness that the point that they make is that the person in pursuit of revenge. . .he says fanaticism



and the unending compulsion (inaudible), the need for revenge which is associated with a couple things: 1.) an extreme over reaction in terms of a desire to annihilate the other as he says to blot out this offender, not just to change him. . .not, as Barbara Deming says, not just to change the behavior but literally destroy and destroy on a massive scale. That's one part of it. The other part that they both mentioned very strongly is this. . .How does the compulsive character of these trends show asks Horney.

Brenman-Gibson: You're talking about Horney?

Ellsberg: This is now Horney, but he says much the same thing. The irresistible urge to get back at others is frequently open to direct (?) often there is no more holding back a person driven toward revenge than an alcoholic determined to go on a binge. Any reasoning meets with cold disdain. Let me footnote that, come back to it. Logic no longer prevails, whether or not the situation is appropriate does not matter, it overrides prudence, consequences for himself and others are brushed aside. It is unacceptable (inaudible) as anybody who is in the grip of a blind passion. The drive. . .this drive. . .

Brenman-Gibson: You know all of this is said about being in love as well.

Ellsberg: Yes, she says that. By the way she says we can most frequently observe the blind, vindictive passion in instances of morbid jealousy which is mainly determined by hurt pride and that's another matter. . .she goes into jealousy here. . .but we can observe the compulsive drive for revenge not only in acute situations, this drive can be the governing passion of a lifetime to which everything is subordinated, including self interest, which (inaudible) talks about. Shows in their overriding prudence, happiness, ambition and even life itself. The enigma of the self-efacing revenge begins to clear up in aggressive vindictiveness, the expenses to count for little, if anything. She's saying it's characteristic of this. Well, she's

describing something I prostrate as a problem in the very first lecture here, which any of you were not at. But I made the point that what I was talking about were existing, actual social processes, not hypothetical ones which have the dual characteristic of being limitless in their destructive potential as preparations for annihilation talking about nuclear planning now, and at the same time were characterized by astounding recklessness, a willingness to risk our own annihilation, typically for causes that might not seem unimportant in some cases, but grotesquely disproportionate to these a . . . risk either a punishment or injury to oneself. That was the social phenomena I said I want to try to understand you know with the psychiatry and I must say I haven't as yet allowed or encouraged other feedback, but it's what I've been pursuing anyway. Let me mention that when I read this today I made a footnote to myself which I put to you. . . ah, take your intuition about revenge. . . isn't there a feeling that calculation, that prudence, carefulness and careful calculation of the risk to oneself is unworthy in these situations. . . that one should not be careful that it's not merely that the passion overrides, but it is. . . I was being intuitive about that. . . that one has a feeling that this is a time when it's wrong to calculate the consequences to anybody. . . by God, I've got to pay him back, this must be punished, this must be punished, this must be. . . so forth . . . something that doesn't have too much to do with love for example, or passion.

Brenman-Gibson: No, but there's a crossover.

Ellsberg: Am I wrong, isn't that true?

Man: Yeah. I was thinking a couple years ago when I felt very vengeful towards somebody and all this. . .

Ellsberg: Doesn't one think in precisely those terms? Somebody else says you're not counting the cost here, or look at this, I don't want to hear



that, I don't want to calculate that.

Brenman-Gibson: You know, that's precisely what happens when a person, for instance, in this very department. . .it's public knowledge. . . is doing all of this because he's fallen in love with somebody, he's left his wife, he left his kids and. . .this, this what you've just said is the constant thing everybody's telling him. . .you're risking everything.

Ellsberg: I take it back, I take it back. In that case you're describing a neurotic passion.

Brenman-Gibson: Yes, right. . .not loving. What we call being in love not loving.

Ellsberg: Of course, we could also then (inaudible) note the conjecture that there's some relation to vindictiveness. . .

Brenman-Gibson: That's what I'm saying.

Ellsberg: No I mean not merely an analogy. Maybe the erotic passion which had a vengeful aspect. I just want to note that possibility.

Brenman-Gibson: Okay, noted. I want to say what I want to say. .Being not an enemy. (laughter) No, seriously, I think what the crossover, if I may say so is that in both cases, it's very. . .one's own sense of one's transcendence existence is at stake either way. .Either way. .meaning not just your personal, individual ego, you know, but that which we talk about one's transcendence. . .meaning we go beyond one's individual ego, what's called in Eastern thought, you know the (?). What is at stake is the "larger, expanded, higher, lower, whatever" but it's expanded and it's, oh (inaudible) so exciting, you know.

Ellsberg: Good enough. What I think you're saying is that the commonality that I hear right now is that in both cases a factor of a, a concept of. . . that's relevant is that of a grandiose self, or, of an idealized other.

Brenman-Gibson: Depends. If you want be pejorative you call it the E<sup>g</sup>randiose self; if you want to be not pejorative, it depends, you know on what's involved.

Ellsberg: We're talking about not normal love, though, we're talking about an erotic kind.

Brenman-Gibson: We're talking about that thing of being in love which Freud describes in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. We're not talking about that "mature" adult where you're going along loving somebody in a grown up way, you're talking about the wild passion that is characterized by all the stuff you just listed for vindictiveness. . . . Risking everything, nonprudence, and really without regard to the consequences to one's "small self."

Ellsberg: But with the opposite goal. . . in the one case to annihilate and the other to unite.

Brenman-Gibson: Yeah. but what I'm trying to say is that with opposite goals, that the means to that can be exactly the same.

Woman: Why is it an opposite goal?

Brenman-Gibson: Well, one is to destroy and one is to unite with.

Woman: Yeah, but destroy the individual boundaries of yourself.

Brenman-Gibson: Yeah, that's the transcendent aspect of it yeah, right. But the aims are different in revenge as against being in love and, oh wow this is so marvelous.

Ellsberg: No, wait. No wait. It has not been said. . . see if I'm understanding you. . . remember the revenge, the implication here, the theory is, for what it's worth, is the ultimate aim is not to hurt the other. In fact, an other is not clearly perceived.

Brenman-Gibson: In which now, which are you talking about?



Ellsberg: In revenge. You don't even clearly perceive another self in this target. The ultimate aim is. . .of this process of revenge. . . or the ultimate hope is to restore your sense of your perfection, your control. Love can be seen in that way. . .this kind of love. . .can be seen. . .isn't this your implication. . .can be seen as making one out of two. . .and the one that is made out of two because the overestimation of this particular (inaudible) object. (laughter)

Brenman-Gibson: Don't look at me. I never use that word. I forbid it to my class.

Ellsberg: Yeah. But this other part of the grand. . .the package. . .is going to be what . . . very close to what to Kohut more recently, would call a grandiose self. Perfect. Perfect. . .together we're perfect. She or he incorporates just what I need to make a perfect person together. Together we're perfect, we're everything, we're the world, we encompass everything.

Brenman-Gibson: Yeah. Like a man and a woman would like to imagine happen.

Woman: Well, this is sort of based on this thing I just read recently (inaudible) and um, she talks about how, um, people in say, this masochist relationship one person is in the role of holding or maintaining control boundaries of because it's too terrifying for both people to, in fact, (inaudible) transcendence where they (inaudible) self. A separate self. It's too terrifying (inaudible) beyond having boundaries so that the one person is allowed to lose the boundaries of that masochist while sadist the controlled, maintains the boundaries for both of them. It seemed to me that what you were talking about. . .that it could be. . .it could seem extremely destructive to succeed in that kind of transcendence of self.

Brenman-Gibson: Did you say destructive?

Woman: Yeah. destructive rather than (inaudible) which you become a (inaudible) that it's not perceived as a positive feeling. It's a terrifying feeling.

Brenman-Gibson: That's important, and I think it's very interesting. I'm not sure it's quite on the thing I was talking about and I don't know how to pull it out.

Ellsberg: This is very interesting. . .because . . .let me put aside the love. . .for a minute. . .anyway. . .it could be very interesting if it turns out that the behavior (inaudible) it's like a lover in some ways.

Brenman-Gibson: A certain kind of being in love, like in group psychology. . .

Ellsberg: Yeah. In any case both ways. . .you have a sense. . .oh. . . here is Kohut comment on that, in its typical form there is other disregard for reasonable limitations in a boundless wish to regress an injury and to obtain revenge. He adds another point which I think modifies what Horney said. . .any reasoning meets the cold disdain, logic no longer prevails. . .which is sort of the model of the government as illogical, incoherent and so forth are. . .Kohut says rather to the contrary. . . the irrationality of eventual attitude becomes even more frightening in view of the fact that in narcissistic personalities as in the paranoia, by the way, the reasoning capacity, while totally under the domination and in the service of the overriding emotion is often not only in tact but even sharpened. In other words, there's plenty of reason, there's plenty of logic that serves the vengeful purpose. . .in fact, in, as in the paranoia, they can be very, very shrewd in getting their way. . .but it's in the service. . .yeah. But then he mentions one parallel in Nazi Germany. . .this dangerous feature of individual psychopathology is the parallel of an equally malignant social phenomena the subordination



of the rational class of technicians (inaudible), to a paranoid leader and the efficiency, even brilliance, of their (inaudible) cooperation in carrying out its purposes. And then it gives some references to Rausch and Spear (?) . . . thinking about Germany, of course, I had a little memory. . . ah, so, all that is an interesting parallel. The um. . now. . shall I give you just a couple more quotes just to show you how. . (pause). Neurotic pride is an exalted self esteem that is not built on existing. . this is Horney now so (inaudible) grandiose self and so forth. . neurotic pride is an exalted self esteem. It is not built upon existing assets but upon an imaginary superiority.

Brenman-Gibson: Read it again.

Ellsberg: Neurotic pride is an exalted self esteem. It is not. . . three main sources of hostile, retaliatory impulses are: hurt pride, externalization of self hate. . and what she means by self hate there is critical or challenging or contradictory impulses which (inaudible) the person, which you externalize as being challenges from outside. And lebensneid, and. . ah. German.

Brenman-Gibson: you mean like for leben? or what?

Ellsberg: You know, oddly enough I don't think he ever defined it.

Brenman-Gibson: How do you spell it?

Ellsberg: L E B E N S N E I D

Woman: Sneid means to cut.

Brenman-Gibson: No not sneid.

Ellsberg: Oddly, (inaudible) Well, anyways forget that. Okay. Neurotic pride is exalted self esteem that is not built upon existing assets but on imaginary superiority. The more a person's whole being has come to rest on such pride, the more vulnerable is he factually no matter how much he tries to hide this fact from himself by putting on a proud mask of invulnerability. He feels that easily humiliated and reacts to it with

vindictive impulses. The externalization. . .well, we'll come back to that. . .

Brenman-Gibson: Boy, that's great.

Ellsberg: Ah, here he describes a. . .both Horney and describe the following phenomenon. . .as such a person experiences it, the others are not only potentially, but factually, hostile. This sounds, by the way, like what (inaudible) would call a paranoid personality. He harbors an ironclad conviction, which may or may not be conscious, that they are not to be trusted and friendliness is merely a deceptive maneuver, that they are out to exploit or humiliate him, to cut his throat, to clip his wings, to drag him down. He would be a fool, thus, not to be on his guard, not to muster his energies for a defensive warfare. He must always be prepared to strike back or since he must be either (?) or (?), he feels safer to anticipate the attack and strike out first. It is. . .this is 1948 (inaudible) If such an attitude is or has become fairly conscious, he may defend it as "self interest." Now. . .because the power to take revenge acquires such vital importance, it is in turn invested <sup>with</sup> pride, a neurotic will not mostly say outright that he is proud of the vindictiveness, he will (inaudible). Since his life is determined by duty, he refers mainly to the duty of never <sup>with impunity.</sup> allowing anybody to insult him. The glorification of vindictiveness is one of the factors contributing to a transformation of moral values. All that pertains to vindictiveness is honest, strong, realistic, while on the other hand many reasons combine to turn friendliness into hypocrisy or generosity into being a sucker. So. . .now. . .I meant to say something that I had <sup>set of</sup> not said earlier in this/lectures which very much deserves saying. . .that deterrence has not been analyzed very much in the psychological as a concept but the essence of the concept of nuclear deterrents is a readiness and preparation to do massive revenge and a country that is first in the field of nuclear deterrents and devotes an enormous part of its gnp to that process



in a much higher proportion of its scientists, its research capability and so forth, is a country devoted to fantasy of potentially revenging ourselves on a potential attack--an attack needless to say in human adversary, because what in. . . what an absolute evil adversary would launch such an attack. The premise then is that there exists such enemies in the world or you wouldn't need this sort of thing. . . but, moreover, though they're ironically, a large part of our own (inaudible) such an evil adversary could launch such an attack. However, since such an attack is possible, we must be prepared not only to avenge it, but if necessary to preempt it.

Man: You see there's a big difference between wanting to avenge a real act that was committed against you and wanted an act committed against you so you can avenge it.

Ellsberg: I don't say wanting it, I'm saying fantasizing the prospect, living with the prospect.

Man: No, I'm not saying. . . I'm saying. . . in the street when a criminal or a kid avenges something that was done to him, we (inaudible) we have another one where somebody looks for an excuse to avenge.

Ellsberg: Oh yes, right.

Man: The second, it seems to me, is where America is more than the first Russia has done nothing to us that we have to avenge.

Brenman-Gibson: It's a little different.

Ellsberg: So. . . a dream of vengeance then on a scale never contemplated by any nation in history is a characteristic of America and has been since 1945.

Woman: I was going to say that vengeance would follow a long gun to the person who feels the need to avenge himself. I was thinking that part of the purpose of deterrence is to prevent such an evil creature from existing and being in a position to attack us.

Ellsberg: No the deterrence is thought of as retaliation it doesn't destroy the other unless the other has done something terrible. Preventive war would be a fantasy which also exists as a fantasy but in a minority in America. The fantasy of blotting out this. . .this. . .but the wide thought is we only annihilate them if they do something terrible first. . .isn't that right.

Woman: Um huh. And, I thought a subpoint would be to always be the more powerful and one of the effects of this all powerfulness would be to keep the other side in an undeveloped position and never allow them too wise to the position. . .being powerful enough.

Ellsberg: Yes, yes. The thought of revenge is an aspect of our efforts at domination which we perceive as avoiding being dominated. Is that what you're saying?

Woman: Yes.

Ellsberg: Yeah, right. . .but one thing I know that I meant to bring out here was. . .we ah. . .of course, quickly recognize in our government, in our nation, attitudes that correspond with this personality description. . . is that after all divorced from the fact that it is the nature of our governmental. . .of our ideology? We live in a nation in which individuals are brought up believing that this is the way the world is. . .that we must always be on our guard, can't trust anybody. I mean we're not told we can't trust anybody, that's not exactly right, except be some people. But we are



told as a model for understanding the world, that the second most powerful country in the world has this evil character, it cannot be trusted, cannot be (inaudible), must be guarded against at every moment and so forth.

Remember now, by the way, that the apparatus was (inaudible) of deterrence against a Soviet attack on Europe at a time when one thing had come up. . . this is the period now that is most exposed in terms of declassification. . . the classification has, quite literally, just reached up to about 1950 or 51 in that extensive way, 52, 53 maybe in the last couple of years. So the early cold war period now. . . the only one we really have the (inaudible) and one has shown absolutely unequivocally is that no responsible official in the government believed that there was any short or (inaudible) any foreseeable danger of a Soviet attack on Western Europe. The main thesis of the cold war to the public was consciously understood to be fallacious.

Brennan-Gibson: You know, that's lost track of all the time, what you just said.

Ellsberg: Well, it's not terribly well known. When it was first brought out in the sixties by revisionists, based on the early declassifications that was regarded as radical (inaudible) and so forth, and now it's very well pinned down but notice the effect of that. The effect of that was to rationalize an apparatus of nuclear revenge to such a massive act which could not have been rationalized any other way. . . which, in other words, told Americans that we lived in a world where we needed to have this preoccupation with revenge, we had to have it, it was inescapable because of this looming threat of a Hitler-like (inaudible) on Western Europe. And, uh, that happens to have been an artificially created mood, but imagine the effect of that on the personalities of Americans, basically, as a model for the way the world is. It doesn't say that all your relations are like that

but it says they could be like that and uh, this is, this is an important part of reality.

Man: What's the motivation of (inaudible) then? Just a grand oddsman of as much power as he can possibly get, even though they knew they weren't going to need it in Europe at that time.

Ellsberg: Let me, well. . .okay look. . .that's a very strong point which I've been wrestling with for a long time and there's a lot more to say on it right now. That was. . .there were several motives at various times. . . one, frankly, if I give the motive that I believe was critical at the time NATO was founded based on latest research, I will sound, I think. . .people will discredit me. . .dare I say this? All right. . . There's a thick book called Peddlers of Crisis now by Jerry Sanders based on an investigation of the first committee for present danger which he investigated only because it had the same name as the recent committee for present danger. . .he was interested if there was any relation. . . what he discovered was that it was essentially the same people to a large extent or many of the same people were involved. . .above all, Paul Nixon who is the head of the new committee for present danger. That's where they did get the old name from the old committee and this committee was to carry out the prescriptions of NSC 68 which you may have heard of. . .the core, the blue print for cold war. I don't want to go into a whole. . . I will give you simply this, in its incredible simplicity, in 1949. . .or I should say, in early 1950, Marshall Plan Aid was due to run out and was clearly not going to be renewed. They only got it renewed again after (inaudible) the fears of that period, but they were facing a Republican Congress which was in a sense and isolationist congress which is no longer exists in the same way but extremely hostile to relations with Europe



in general, very suspicious of your (inaudible) ah. . .who also didn't believe in big government, government spending, big arms, wish we had more of them back, Taft or Taft Republicans of that period. So, but in any case, it was clear they were not going to renew the economic lead of the Marshall Plan, at the same time, European recovery was languishing very greatly and looked bad. There was a considerable likelihood that if the aid was not continued, two things would happen: first, Europe would not be able to pay for exports from the U.S. which was regarded by the people running our government at that time as extremely critical in avoiding a depression of the thirties. . .that maintaining our exports was absolutely critical to doing that and Europe was the first area which was important to that so Marshall Plan was conceived, actually, as a way of maintaining U.S. exports to Europe, it was not the only purpose but it was one sufficient purpose. . .and, in fact, the way the Marshall Plan was amounted to was simply a basis for judging the amount of aid needed was actually ah, ah, looking at the level of pre-war exports and the level that they wanted to maintain, adding those up basically as most of the Marshall Plan money was used in the loan as it was used to buy goods from the United States. That was one side. The other side was though that they were concerned that if Europe didn't recover and it needed this aid to recover, the dollars, there would be a strong shift to the left in places like France and Italy with their second largest party being the Communist Party and that there would be (inaudible) and there would be a shift to the left which might move in a variety of ways that we didn't like, toward. . .not toward Communism, it wasn't conceived, but was a possibility in the longer run, but more immediately toward "neutralism," which meant a number of things which I won't go into. But the point was

they wanted Europe's economy to recover too. Congress would not again, without a Berlin Blockade, vote that money for um, ah, economic aid. They had learned from 1947 on that there was one thing a Republican would vote and that was military aid as in Greece and Turkey, military aid under the threat of insurgency in Greece and Turkey. As early as that then, the early Truman Doctrine, the notion had been tried, Atchinson's point, I'm sorry. . .Vandenberg's point, if you want that kind of money you've got to do this, you've got to scare the hell out of the country. And the Truman Doctrine was an early example of that.

Brenman-Gibson: If you want what kind of money?

Ellsberg: Ah, the money that you wanted for Greece and Turkey. You've got to scare. . .in fact, that's when Atchinson took over for Marshall in a briefing and said, we're not just facing Communism in Greece and Turkey we are facing Russia. . .(inaudible) which happened to be totally wrong Stalin was worried about the atom bomb, Stalin was discouraging the Greek insurgency, Discouraging Tito from helping the Greek insurgents. . .that was one of the factors in the Yugoslav-Stalin dispute which lead to the split. .Which we knew later but we didn't have any evidence on what Atchinson said but already he had the key elements here that what you're facing is a military threat and it is a threat directly from Russia. And then Vandenberg said if you will say that for the country, Mr. President, you know, then we can give you support. . .Vandenberg is a Republican. Okay. They decided then, somehow you had to run this through again in 1950. this was, however, was being planned before Korea and there was no big threat upon the horizon. Ah. . .the theme of. . .the reasoning behind NSC 68 and Nixon and the rest of the committee was, the only way we can get dollars to Europe for these two purposes of sustaining Europe's political recovery and sustaining our own economic needs because of a recession was threatening



also in 1949, is to build a case for military aid for Europe, which had not been a factor in the late forties, hadn't been discussed. . .and the program was conceived in those terms. To make. . .to decide to give military aid to Europe, there had to be a threat, intelligence was not providing us with a threat to Western Europe, but that didn't keep you from saying that there was a threat.

Man: What was the argument against continuing the Marshall Plan?

Ellsberg: No. The argument. . .it was expiring, it was running out. . . no chance in the world. . .Congress was already very restive about having voted it in in the first place.

ELLISBERG CAMBRIDGE COURSE - CAMBRIDGE HOSPITAL

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(Snowstorm)  
Brilliant

March 29, 1984

Ellsberg: This leads to the question, but I don't want to get in. . . forgot to mention. . . none of these people mention scapegoating. They do not mention. . . she doesn't mention in this whole review of revenge the major form of social scapegoating, which is war or at least that's an interpretation of war, it's an aspect of war. War is a way of having your representatives kill other people for you as a way of draining off the energies that might otherwise be used (inaudible). The title of the book, <sup>"Strength Through Peace" (?)</sup> (inaudible), the title itself justifies the book. It derives from what Reagan keeps reminding us of: If you want peace, prepare for war, the Roman slogan which Reagan keeps telling us. I wrote a note that that was by a particular Latin Roman, the era that that was written and I forget who it was, might have been (inaudible). But in any case, the era that <sup>it</sup> was written, <sup>in</sup> the first century A.D. was a period, interestingly, when Rome had no national organized enemy left in the world. It had only imperial responsibilities in it's (inaudible) empire. Preparing for war <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ preparing for colonial operations, if you want peace, which is to say if you want pacification, you know, prepare for war as we've seen. The reason that thing sounds a little funny since then, it's always applied to the modern situation. If you want peace with the other power, you know with other powers in the world, you can see perfectly well that preparing for it increases the risk but preparing for war against natives and (Inaudible) doesn't in the short run, at least, threaten your own annihilation. But. . . his (this is the turn in the new thing), coalition for Peace Through Strength. And the motto of the Reagan team is "peace through strength." So they were thinking of the book the title of which would be Strength Through Peace.



Ellsberg: And to change the concept, then of strength. . .

Man: (inaudible) "Peace if it ever comes, will not come through the fear of war."

Brenman-Gibson: Well that's what <sup>Gandhi</sup> ~~Dandi~~ says too. If you want to be genuinely non-violent.

Ellsberg: Well, you see what she's saying here is that the individual, the neurotic individual, who lives in a state of war, individual war with the world and readiness to preempt, to retaliate, to (inaudible) is not really going to give up that state until he comes to think of peaceful relations as strong and acceptable and love it until he loves peace in that sense. He fears peace because peace to him means subordination and weakness and he's got to see it as livable and the same would be true for a nation. You see love of peace, (inaudible) really even to trust peace, to believe. . . there <sup>are</sup> is a lot of people in this country, who if you press them on the question of conversion (after all their talk about how they hate the Russians and how they distrust the Russians and everything) will say, "what will happen to this economy if we gave up all the war as you suggest. It's interesting. That's not the first thing people say, I've often heard <sup>the</sup> say (sort of) Proposition 6 will be will be very hard for us. How are we going to keep people at work?"

Man: (inaudible) thought about what would it take.

Brenman-Gibson: I don't know. I gave a speech about that at Williams College about a month ago - The Educators for Social Responsibility had gotten together and this was a bunch of teachers - and the teachers <sup>said</sup> ~~said~~

"So what do you recommend in the classroom, what should be taught?" And I said, "Well, I'll tell you. . . What I think should be taught really ~~should~~ <sup>is</sup> be a discriminating that a child should learn to be discriminating ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> civilly, disobedient. So they said, <sup>and</sup> how do you teach that. I hadn't

thought about it before and I said to them that it seemed to me that you teach that, whether you're a parent or a teacher, ~~there are a lot of parents here too~~, by somehow taking seriously that children should be assisted to know that yes, they do have choices. Meaning you are a *separate (?)* (inaudible) person and I know you want to be and, therefore, I know you have the capacity to look this over, whether you're three or six or (inaudible) whatever and say, "Let me think about this now." Indeed this is this the curriculum (inaudible). *worked out by Educators for Social Responsibility.*

Ellsberg: It's all choices.

Brenman-Gibson: Yes. It's quite marvelous. It's inventive and in a way it's <sup>be</sup> radical as anything could be psychologically, <sup>and</sup> socially.

(inaudible) and I'm sure that this you know, great (inaudible) must have come from (inaudible) and the whole bunch of them because I (inaudible) next door to them all the time. So this is what I answered and I do believe it. Now, the question is, do we have time or is anybody going to let us do that <sup>(teach children to recognize Epil)</sup> (inaudible) in the schools, so, as you know, this has been challenged all over the country. I mean Phyllis Schafley rushes <sup>sig</sup> around tearing up and burning all the workbooks, ~~oh absolutely~~. Listen, I don't know if she personally burns them, but in every city <sup>where</sup> that she talks she <sup>attack</sup> (inaudible) all this stuff <sup>(ESE)</sup> and it's logical that she would.

You know, the principle is yes, you really do have choices. You are not a ~~my~~ slave. In fact, I sometimes wondered ~~if~~ dear son if I'm your slave, ~~like that~~. Meaning that you have to really believe this, though. <sup>+</sup> That you do not want this child to be your slave; you don't want this other human being to be your slave, nor do you want to be their slave. That's very difficult <sup>for parents and children</sup>. I mean it's not exactly a new idea, <sup>BUT</sup> (neither hammer nor anvil, *etc etc*)

~~etc. want to really~~ if you're a big, big person and here's a little, little



child. For that child to feel yes, I am your slave, <sup>to say</sup> good Lord you can wipe them <sup>out and</sup> I mean they know it. And for you not to feel, <sup>"y"</sup> yes, you are my slave is also a tremendous achievement. <sup>(POWER issues)</sup>

Ellsberg: I wonder. . . is it a characteristic of <sup>the</sup> middle class to raise their children. <sup>that way?</sup> . . . their children do grow up with a sense of (inaudible) ? choice which is said to be the difference between the cultured and the poor.

Brenman-Gibson: There's something wrong with <sup>that</sup> ~~it~~ because, you know what's wrong with that, <sup>much of so-called "progressive education"</sup> ~~which~~ has become a certain kind of, I think, romantic and mushy-headed laissez-faire, <sup>that</sup> is ~~that~~ you do not offer <sup>the</sup> that child ~~in the~~ <sup>or</sup> ~~way within~~ boundaries, the benefit of what you know that they don't, and really begin to. . .

Ellsberg: I wonder, though, if there isn't a relation, when you said "civil disobedience" that is not (inaudible) the trend of progressive education (which does not ultimately challenge authority when it comes to ultimate values or the direction of things), isn't quite apart from having choices which can be purely instrumental or egotistical. Isn't the issue <sup>really of</sup> having, by the way, a set notion of standards of rights that you share with others. ( <sup>that</sup> others have as well as you ) <sup>and</sup> <sup>that</sup> when infringed <sup>on</sup> give you an obligation actually to resist. There are ways of doing that civilly. So when do you disobey? Not just when your egotistical desires are challenged or not when your way of carrying out the boss's wishes (inaudible) but when the boss is wrong.

Brenman-Gibson: Absolutely. I would not only 'accept <sup>this</sup> ~~it~~, but thank you.

Man: Maybe one aspect is that it should be a sense of (inaudible) responsibility for the whole planet and the whole human race (inaudible) individuals.

Brenman-Gibson: Interestingly you know, Harry <sup>Stack</sup> Speck Sullivan who was really a deeply suffering human being, he used to say when he was drunk, in bars in Baltimore, <sup>I am</sup> and probably the only psychoanalyst in the world who is a. an alcoholic, b. a homosexual, and c. a schizophrenic, you know, all of which he was at the same time.

Ellsberg: Is ~~she~~ right, the only one?

Brenman-Gibson: As far as I know. Whatever you think. . . (laughter)  
No, but wait, this is not what I wanted to end that sentence with, I wanted to say that, after all, Harry <sup>Stack</sup> Speck Sullivan, he said about the schizophrenic, "He is more commonly human than otherwise."

Ellsberg: More what?

Brenman-Gibson: "More commonly human than otherwise." Meaning this kind of let us look at the common humaness in all of this stuff. . . whether it concerns the alcoholic or whatever or ~~whatever and there was something that you read. . .~~ I don't know whether it was Horney or Kohut but it really rang that same bell, and it has something to do with the communality in the primitive, anarchist society in which ~~somehow~~ everybody's rights and everybody's interests (inaudible) where self-interest and mutual interest <sup>are seen</sup> really seem as one. This is what he meant about (inaudible), violent adversarial, I stand corrected. Violent is an important word in there. But it's that kind of an image.

Man: That's almost <sup>Carol</sup> ~~Al~~ Gilligan stuff. . . mutual. . .

Brenman-Gibson: Absolutely. And you know <sup>Ellen</sup> Goodman who is not a social scientist or psychologist or whatever is a hell of a smart woman wrote a piece back when our <sup>Peace</sup> Women's Initiative first met last December which she called <sup>"Bridging the Caretaking Gap"</sup> bridging the Caretaking gap and this was her theme. You know.



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And she said that she felt that women were peculiarly poised at this moment of history to bring this point of view into general power where indeed self interests and mutual interests can, indeed, be one thing. And certainly (inaudible), I'm sure. (inaudible) a part of her whole (inaudible).

Ellsberg: Of course you know it's the non-violent approach that (inaudible) presents a way of being strong and being self-assertive without being violent.

Brenman-Gibson: Yes, right.

Ellsberg: After reading that book by the way, which emphasizes the ambiguity of vindictiveness, but the fact that it can take different forms . . . and um, it can be you know transmuted (inaudible) Barbara Deming's point in one of the articles I've put out ~~that~~ recognizes that <sup>(V)</sup>one has anger that seeks to destroy the point is to transmute that <sup>into</sup> anger that (to root out the murderous impulse from anger even though it's there, to recognize it and then reject it and transcend it) and use the anger to force for change in the other without destroying. *QEHF* (inaudible) But I am prepared to. . . just as there is power in. . . this is often ignored by (inaudible) They try to deny there is anything coercive about (inaudible) *militant non-v (?)*

Brenman-Gibson: I don't quite believe that.

Ellsberg: Well, it's not a good analogy, it's just a denial. *AB* Better analyses (inaudible) do acknowledge it's both coercive and forceful (as Barbara Deming says), and even aggressive and (inaudible) but it's a question of form. Um. . . but one thing they don't admit. . . and I'm prepared to entertain now. . . is that it also builds some energies of vindictiveness. Ah, sometimes that's quite obvious by the way.

Brenman-Gibson: That's interesting.

Ellsberg: Shaming the other person (laughter) maybe for a social purpose.

But it's not without its roots and a desire for revenge and resentment.

And she does point out very definitely that the witness the truth-teller *offers?*

(which can take more or less aggressive forms) is a form of vindication and of revenge.

Brenman-Gibson: I was at a meeting at *Arlanthus* (Inaudible) the group down there. . .

— really radical Catholics who do civil disobedience every ten minutes

around here and they were having this precise discussion of whether or

not in certain acts they were planning to do. *there was some vindictiveness.* ~~like~~ *like* somebody said she

would. . . (no it was a man). . . that he was planning to take a whole bunch

of his own blood, throw it on the floor and then slosh around in it as

the people were coming into the *Draper hall* (inaudible). And we were discussing

that, and the discussion was fascinating. . . whether or not ~~somebody or~~ *the man*

~~else, a man also, a woman didn't raise this a man did, to the man who~~ *was aware of any such impulse.*

*who* was planning this action, this particular symbolic action. *He said to the man.*

"Tell me something, what was your feeling when you were fantasizing this plan, when you were getting this idea? <sup>a</sup> . . . which I thought was marvelous

question. . . And the guy said, *well* I just thought you know it would be

a really good image to show, you know, the blood, spilling your own blood

and let them see the blood on the floor, let them even walk in it, you

know. . . as one does on the battlefield and so on. And the questioner

said to the person *who* had been planning this bloody action. . . ~~he said~~ *"He*

*you* feeling like, anything like vindictive at the time? *the man* ~~And he~~ did not

admit that he did. . . he said no, no, no, how can you say that, I wasn't

feeling vindictive, I was only wanting to bear witness and then went on.



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And the questioner was very bright, and I think that the man (though I don't know him very well but I know him a little bit, very self-honest kind of man) said, "Well, I don't know it comes across like that you were really wanting to make those (inaudible) <sup>guys</sup> come in their guilt pretty bad and really do something mean to them, you didn't feel that at all?" The other guy (planning the action) never did agree that he had felt vindictive in the fantasy though the questioner <sup>kept</sup> was saying this. And this was in their own group. . . ~~kind of talking about.~~ . . I think it was really (psychologically <sup>a</sup> remarkably sophisticated ~~their~~ discussion, and on the whole, remarkably honest. One can be as honest as one can afford to be you know. That's it.

Ellsberg: It's an interesting discussion, certainly.

Brennan-Gibson: Very. . . even though we had only a small number of people.

Oh, you know I wanted to say one last thing to your point which you keep coming back to, and of course, we all keep coming back to in our minds. . .

which is, <sup>it</sup> ~~is this~~ is this imaginable that anything can change? And the only way I've ever thought recently there's any chance that it could change is if the evolutionary imperative, a kind of ethics of survival if you like, is recognized at this point on some dim level, <sup>in a significant segment of society</sup> I don't care on what level.

And when you attend a meeting as I did last weekend, of women's action for the nuclear disarmament, the (inaudible) people had a three-day conference. . . I must say that if there is anything to this evolution of some

change in consciousness, you sure felt it in the air at that meeting. And I do not incline to be kind of you know, <sup>in the California mode,</sup> On the vibes here are great and

"~~stuff like that, the energy,~~ <sup>T</sup> the fact is they were (inaudible)"

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Man: It's not only teaching children, it's presenting children with parents who don't humiliate the thing in the ways that. . .

Brenman-Gibson: So you have to teach the parents first. . . Oh God, I wish we had time to get all this done in the world.

Ellsberg: Does anybody know any references to this. . . now on this, they seem to be so sparse. . . on the subject of revenge, vindictiveness.

Brenman-Gibson: I don't see them around. . . what are your dates for your next time. . . we'll have to send out a notice because I meant to announce it last time and then I don't know it got so late. What have you got in your book there?



*Good!*  
Ellsberg: Ah, it's assertions and independence or autonomy within our sphere, our self, in the free world, the non-Soviet block, in Indo China, Korea and elsewhere Cuba and so forth. I want to mention two other things psychologically, listen to this. . . ah, we know that all of these factors that render vindictiveness compulsive certainly are powerful, but we know that even powerful inner forces can be overcome if there are other alternatives which have a strong appeal. The problem she says that the neurotic alternative, the only alternative that the neurotic sees, consists of self-effacing attitudes, you're faced with a threat and so forth, you accept it in a self-effacing way or do you avenge yourself? Deprived of the weapon of vindictiveness and, by the way, if one word is associated with Richard Nixon in personality terms, it is vindictiveness, grudge forever, always keeping score, endlessly remembering people you needed to get. . . remember the "Enemies list"? These are the people we will get after the election. They shit on us, they blocked us, they frustrated us, we'll get um, we'll get um, and that was the enemy.

Man: Was it Carter or Johnson who said, "don't get angry, get even?"

Ellsberg: All of them say that (laughter). Deprived of the weapon, in other words, if you gave up the weapon of vindictiveness, the patient sees himself as a helpless jellyfish, a prey to anybody who chooses to step on him and a prey also to his own self-contempt. Do you recall the phrase, "pitiful, helpless giant"? Now let me tell you when that came. That came after two events as Haush shows, it was in association with our invasion of Cambodia. . . but he was lashing out at that time. . . what Haush shows in his book are all the roots of that thing and the two are outstanding: one was his secret frustration to annihilate the North Vietnamese and defy his ultimatum . . . annihilate, the savage blow, he wasn't able to carry that out because the peace movement had forced

him to back down from <sup>an</sup> explicit, dated ultimatum. . . it was an extreme humiliation to Nixon. He was afraid that the Russians would regard him as weak, as a bluffer, that someone who would carry out. . . of course, all this he saw as a statesman. . . but let's see where it <sup>led</sup> ~~leads~~. That <sup>led</sup> ~~lead~~ in him doing. . . he had to think of something big that would restore his standing in the eyes of the Russians. Remember that we didn't even know that he had this humiliation because we didn't know he made this ultimatum.

Brennan-Gibson: When did he make that ultimatum?

Ellsberg: The ultimatum was dated November 3, the moratorium was October 15 and November 15. It bracketed his ultimatum and he was unable to carry it out. So first he was in a state of extreme frustrated. First he meant to revenge himself on the North Vietnamese on turning down his ultimatum; second, he was frustrated, and there's a great deal in here about frustrated vindictiveness. . . frustrated carrying that out and made to look a coward or bluffer in the eyes of the Russians, the only independent judge that he valued, by the peace movement. The next thing was, and this has been known for some time, that he nominated deliberately, he tried partly in anger in Congress. . . this was something else. . . he was going to shove Hainsworth down their throats for Supreme Court Justice. Hainsworth was not only rejected by Congress, but he then deliberately chose an absolute total asshole, Carswell and said by God, if they won't take Hainsworth, they'll have to take Carswell. And his second candidate in a row is rejected by Congress. This had never happened to any President before and he was absolutely furious. And it was said at the time, and <sup>Hans</sup> ~~Hans~~ confirms now, the mood in which he ordered the invasion of Cambodia which was a direct provocation to the peace movement



as well as North Vietnam was, "I'll show them in Congress who's tough." So these are the persecutors now going into Cambodia. And to justify Cambodia. . . how does he justify it? The alternative to my doing that, which by the way, was against (inaudible) advice, the alternative is to be a pitiful, helpless giant. The patient's dread of self-effacing trends is in part based on experience. He may have had an abject feeling of no rights, he may have come close to a morbid dependency or a sense of self-sacrificing. (inaudible) all been through to some extent but to some extent it is more salient for some than for others, or he may have reached a sense, a dangerous weakness, the patient cannot start to square himself with his vindictive trends unless the weakness lurking, that he sees lurking in the other extreme is diminished, the sense that the alternative is total weakness.

Brennan-Gibson: The interesting word is "pitiful" because to be a helpless giant, you know all right, that's not so terrible, but the whole notion of really, Nixon's really self-pity which, of course, we know a lot about from this whole history, that he then is avoiding even that. . . I mean to be the one who is not only helpless and a giant but who is to be felt sorry for. . . which has a contempt in it, doesn't it?

Ellsberg: Well I'll tell you something. . . that rings in my own memory when you mention that word. . . the psychiatrist at the CIA who was given the job of doing my psychoanalytical profile said in affidavit, first in a report to Helm, then he repeated in affidavit that his instructions from Hunt and Liddy were to find data on me in the psychoanalyst's file that they could use to discredit me in various ways and make me "pitiful." (laughter) Now wait. . . (inaudible) any question about that. He said I wasn't interested in anything pitiful, I mean that was the last thing I had in mind, but the psychiatrist was then asked and repeated, No, that

Good  
Lord

was the phrase they used, they wanted me to be a pitiful (inaudible).

And it always has been a little puzzling why they (inaudible) that

this to a Nixon, let's say, would be exactly the worst thing you could  
do to somebody. So it's interesting.

Major

Man: It's probably one of the self-pitying figures. (inaudible)

Ellsberg: By the way, she gives several types of the vindictive person  
here.

Brenman-Gibson: She's nobody's fool, Karen Horney. Karen Horney was  
nobody's fool. Matter of fact, when I was fifteen I wrote her a letter  
I'm miserable, depressed, will you analyze me? She never answered me.

Ellsberg: (laughter) I know you feel compelled to say that because  
you're in a profession filled with male fools who think that she was  
a fool. (TRUE!)

Brenman-Gibson: That's not like I feel compelled to say it. . .but.  
You're right, you're right.

Ellsberg: Here's this one. Self-effacing, openly aggressive vindictiveness,  
ah, this is one and then another one that's related to it. It looks  
opposite but (inaudible) self-effactive vindictiveness operates subversively  
and indirectly suffering is used unconsciously to make others feel  
guilty. The person itself puts less stress on justice than the (inaudible)  
but experiences himself as a particularly good person who is constantly  
abused by others. (or locates school counterplayers whose usually  
repressed vindictiveness is pressing for expression. A good  
fit. if it  
doesn't  
get out  
control.

Brenman-Gibson: Who is always kicked around, right?

Ellsberg: No, there's a famous childhood story that came out that Nixon  
had written in school, one of his earliest known documents, about a little  
dog, a good little dog who is terribly abused, not fed, kicked around. . .  
So there, as you see, is the self-pity.



Brenman-Gibson: Isn't that something? Won't have Richard Nixon to kick around anymore.

Ellsberg: The dread of weakness and all that. Now I want to make a point of my own.

Brenman-Gibson: You're making points of your own every minute.

Ellsberg: Well, no, I mean new (inaudible) um. . .oh, no this is important the person who believes he's in this war, believes he needs every ounce of energy for the battle without and hence cannot jeopardize it by admitting either fault or weakness.

Brenman-Gibson: What war, what are you talking about?

Ellsberg: War is actually my word, I mean a person who is in this state of constant attack being hostile, accusing others and so forth. He must make his own position unassailable.

Brenman-Gibson: Is this Kohut?

Ellsberg: This is Horney. He believes he needs every ounce of energy for the battle without and hence cannot jeopardize it by admitting either faults or weakness. Unfortunately this strategical necessity often compels him to take a further step which is not even to feel either weak or wrong. This means he automatically tries to stifle all inner experiences that arouse any doubt in these two regards. It leaves but few feelings he can own. . .the inner necessity never to be wrong would mean not only to deny error, but to disown anything in himself that is irrational or contradictory and compulsive. The resulting self-righteousness, then, is not so much a matter of vanity but of self-preservation. The necessity (again?) never to feel weak may involve, <sup>eschewing(?)</sup> a whole range of positive feelings toward others or toward life itself, tenderness, affection, sympathy, love, gratitude, joy, enthusiasm, ~~what~~ what is left often is merely righteous indignation, anger and highly distilled (unsure) feelings. Sometimes

Yes, it is so perceived

of Erik's "disdain" in later life (or Jeff Masson's now)

feelings that animals go Scot free. Here is the deepest. . .I want to emphasize this necessity never to feel weak and then one final thing, the earliest essay that they describe in this field, the only other, is by Franz Alexander (1938) which is this. . .and I'll just say this briefly. . .

Brenman-Gibson: <sup>He was</sup> Also put down, unfairly by colleagues, though a man, <sup>not a woman (like Horney)</sup>

Ellsberg: Alexander? Yep. Okay. He presented the shame of a self-psychological perpetuating cycle of phenomena. . .specifically he described a dynamic cycle. . .and I'm going to run over this because I'm going to modify. . .of hostility. . .this is apparently hostility toward someone else, another person, or something that's been done to you: guilt; submission, non-expression of the hostility there; reactive aggression, more guilt and so forth. . .well, put that behind for a moment. Kohut's comment is, he thus restricted himself to explaining narcissistic rage, reactive aggression, which follows upon shameful submission. Um, now, ah. I just wanted to bring that up. Now here is the point I wanted to make, In this book which is a lay person's book, basically, but really quite good in looking at many aspects of revenge. . .in particular in art, in criminal, mostly criminal, by the way, it focuses on the questions like capital punishment and so forth. The thesis of the book by the way is that vindictiveness is universal. The idea that revenge is inhuman and wrong and deplorable is simply unrealistic. . .that it's a universal need for, felt as a need and is a need and that if one denies it, totally represses it it will just break out in worse forms that, she for instance says that unless society provides , I won't go into all of it but her theme is that what you should distinguish between acceptable and reasonable



and useful form of punishment, revenge, deterrents and so forth she's thinking again in a domestic context<sup>criminal</sup> mostly. So as to avert either the rage that goes with unavenged love in the social.

Brenman-Gibson: I'm sorry. Could you say that again?

Ellsberg: She says the state really. . .one of the services that the state provides in effect is that it takes away the right to violent revenge by the <sup>individual</sup> person. . .by compensating. . .by assuring that the state will carry out that revenge or vindictiveness, that punishment, in effect she's saying that what happens in the courts and in prison and whatnot should be recognized should be recognized psychologically and the need to be satisfying, a need for revenge, a need for punishment, a need for vindictiveness, and moreover she says that's legitimate. Yeah. The alternative would be private vendettas or various explosions, unless you believe that wrong can be righted by the government machinery or society or community in some way you will feel compelled to do this on your own. These are his kinds of ideas. But. . .so, I want to say first her main point is to legitimize a kind of revenge but at the same time within a critique. . .you know. . ."unrestrained revenge is self destructive, destructive to society and so forth" and she also opposes capital punishment for various reasons. She says you can be vindictive, you can punish, you can right wrongs without actually killing people, that's her point. In fact, in that context, she's even an admirer of Martin Luther King and of Ghandi. So, ah, it's an interesting book. I noticed one thing here and it's not corrected in either of these other papers either, not modified. She, the <sup>only</sup> entire focus of the book implies, it focuses on the relationship between the person who has been wronged and the person who has done the wrong and therefore should be punished. Uh, in principle her, you could say it's an

likewise,  
"deterrence"

Not  
any  
more  
or it's  
all  
over.

overall discussion of revenge but in practice it focuses almost entirely on the criminal justice system although all things like sexual jealousy, all domestic. . .and as I say that in every case, the revenge fantasies, the actions, the revenge carried out by society whoever, by the person who has done the wrong okay. Neither she, nor I would say Kohut, comes, mentions ever, even once, what seems to me the dominant at least a major spectacular aspect of revenge behavior that typically works itself out on a person other than the one who has done the wrong. . .even in the vendettas that she looks at. . .you kill some other member of the family even if you're in the same family. . .you don't kill the person who did the wrong, you kill somebody else. . .or yourself. But the fantasy. . . well that. . .turn inward. . .all right. . .but where there is revenge, externally point one I would make is, it's fair to say typically, you work out these vindictive feelings, even if you recognize them, against somebody other than the person who did the initial wrong. By the way the example that he gives. . .that she starts with from the Greek tragedy is the model of revenge. . .by the way (inaudible) by the way one real examination on one point she says it's striking that psychoanalysts don't look at revenge since the Greek myths that they so draw on for models are dominated by the notion of revenge. This is <sup>Sagan</sup> Ely Sagan's point that the Greek, (not just myths) the Greek sagas, epics are dramas of revenge above all. . .and, but notice one thing on this. . .the key myth that the (inaudible) are all based on starts with (I won't read the whole thing) but with the ah. . .Atreus, king of Argos banished his brother Thestes. Atreus devised a plan more cunning than any open attack on Thestes. He killed Thestes children and arranged for them to be served to their father at a banquet and when Thestes realized what his brother had done he cursed the entire house of Atreus and the whole trilogy now starts

*Very important*

*We are eating our children*



with the unfolding of this curse, starts with the children. Agamemnon is Atreus' son, he is murdered by his wife, Clytemnestra, in revenge for his sacrifice of their daughter, Iphigenia, who had to die because a seer informed Agamemnon that the Greek fleet would be destroyed before reaching Troy without the sacrifice of his own daughter. Um. . . Medea later in this tragedy, of course, revenges herself on her husband for sexual jealousies by slaying by his and her children. Oedipus, who had been put out to die by his father. . . who, we focus on the fact that Oedipus killed his father. . . but it's also noteworthy that the precursor to that was that his father tried to kill him. Notice, by the way, we've got a case here, which is the first chapter because this is taken Greeks, she draws no attention to it. In no case is the revenge worked out on the person who committed crime. <sup>He</sup> It so happens that the Greek myth is you not only kill somebody else, but you kill children. So my second point that I was going to say was, and I derive this from Leonard Coober's study of genocide, now which was extremely good I think. . . which revealed not only the ubiquity of genocide, and massacre in genocide far more common currently and in history than I had realized but the patterns of well. . . the first point I pointed to was scapegoating and the second point <sup>that</sup> is the scapegoat is the clearly weak, defenseless person, above all women and children. . . but in particular (inaudible) of women and children. Now this is done by ordinary people it's not done by mobs in the (inaudible), it's done by soldiers. . . and soldiers do train themselves to fight other soldiers and they do fight other soldiers, they're not afraid of fighting other soldiers. But they don't always choose the safest target. Quite the contrary as a matter of fact. . . they're often very self-sacrificing.

a  
woman  
child-  
killer  
even in  
myth

has Oedipus?



In these circumstances it always follows humiliations and vindictiveness, the chosen target is women and children. When you read that book on genocide you can no longer think, as I started by thinking, that massacre of women and children is an extremely abhor<sup>ve</sup>ant phenomena, it's a very common phenomena. They are the chosen targets of this kind of revenge. Okay.

Brenman-Gibson: That's fine as far as it goes, but let me tell you something. In women's prisons, they isolate the woman prisoner. . . (this came actually out of Framingham) . "We isolate the woman prisoner precisely because she has killed a child." . meaning that women do not forgive this. . do not do this. (Usually)

Ellsberg: Well, there is the Medea or the woman who's in the cell. . .

Brenman-Gibson: Meaning it's atypical, it's not normative.

Ellsberg: Well strictly speaking, the person who, on an individual, private basis. . . the man who is a child abuser, by the way, this is a refutation of what you just said, is just as endangered in prison is he not? Is not a child abuser, a male child abuser, a serious child abuser, is in danger from other male prisoners? Of course it isn't women who carry out these massacres. Now here is. . . this first of all I'm saying that it's interesting and curious that none of them address what seem to be rather obvious social points if you think about the phenomena. . . that the revenge is typically or often looks for a scape-goat of some sort and second that often focuses on the weak even when the person doing it is not weak. But they seek out the weak, after all the Jews for lots of reasons were a weak undefending community. . . okay. This is social behavior and that could have an individual parallel, an individual psychology. There is what struck me. First I'll take

I'm not sure.

Not so far.

Even the button gas hess are 95% male (SAC etc)

Franz Alexander's point that. . . Franz Alexander's point which I think is extremely. . . as I look at that chain there's one element in it that strikes me as extremely interesting and novel. He has a dynamic sequence of feelings and events. . . it isn't just from here to there. . . injury to reaction. . . You're talking in effect about a buildup of revenge that leads to an explosion and so on. Part of that buildup is a prior acceptance, a submission to an insult, an injury, feelings of hostilities which are not immediately reacted to (inaudible) for some reason. . . he says even for reasons of guilt, but let's just say inhibited for one of a thousand reasons. . . starting with. . . where does the pattern of seeking scapegoating start? Can the little infant safely act out his rage at a parent? There ought to be something, a doll or whatever, you've got to kick something. . . but you cannot kick mommy at least twice very often. . .

COCKING (sic)  
(as in mine)

Brenman-Gibson: You know when I brought home my second son from the hospital, right. . . and the older one was there, and I bring him into the room and I'm nursing him, <sup>(2 1/2)</sup> <sup>(the brown me)</sup> <sup>he said,</sup> "Mommy can I kick him gently?" (turn tape here)

Ellsberg: So um, on the one hand you can see some familiar. (inaudible) So, that's right. . . so, ah, on one hand you can see some familiar things but let's go now to the more adult situations. . . At least you learn. . . you have to learn to submit you have to submit. If you (inaudible) you better (inaudible) to someone else. But Franz Alexander is suggesting though that the rage that eventually gets worked out on some victim, I assert, typically someone other than the original. . . reflects not only what was originally done to you but certainly what this new victim is alleged to have done which may be totally fictitious. . . but



in part reflects your own shame at the sense that you submitted because

the other person was too powerful, you were too dependent on them, the  
 were too deferential, you couldn't go back at your boss, you couldn't  
 go at your mother, you know whoever. . .you couldn't fight that person  
 so you take it out. . .when did we invade Grenada, by the way? One week  
 after the Marines had been blown up in Lebanon and what did we do about  
 that? So we know all this displacement of hostility.

Man: You (inaudible) about this political issue is control isn't it?

Ellsberg: But now. . .okay. . .that's one aspect of the. . .but now

I'll give you, now a good one. . .(laughter) Wait. . .I'm going to  
 read. . .this is something that I actually had written before and I was  
 going to read it last week, but I now see it in a new way. I don't  
 remember when I wrote this. . .but, oh, I think I wrote it after reading

Sagan a long time ago. Hypothesis: . . .Revenge aims at that part of the

self that has permitted or provoked humiliation. . .both projected

outside (and remember: I didn't go into this but the characteristic of

this personality is to reject all self criticism, all things as despised

aspects of the self are entirely projected on outsiders. That's an

aspect of everybody to some extent but to an extreme degree in these

people. . .so projected outside weak. . .what is it that permitted or

provoked humiliation? One's weakness. . .one's readiness to accept the

appearance that you were a patsy to this kind of thing that made you safe

to humiliate. So I'm saying you project the parts of yourself that lead

to humiliation outside and you punish those outside elements, the weak,

the defenseless women and children, not the aggressor. And, I'm going to

modify this, and internally the revenge aims at the part of the self

internally, the reckless and suicidal aspects of the action. The reckless

This suggests to me the possibility you + Pat had some heavy strife when you returned (early November 1983) from Europe (seeing in THE BLAST in St Louis) Am I wrong?

Excellent stuff (Construct Yourself!)

what an item.

Also: the introjection - and re-projecting - and punishing self!

and suicidal aspects of the revenge is punishing yourself in part because the self that permitted the. . . (that part, by the way, is seen as weak and enemies who, we see them as enemies, they don't look like enemies to other people but somehow we manage to see--we, the Germans, let us say see the Jews as enemies. Ah, you epitomize weakness exactly that. . . why are they enemies? They're enemies because they're that part of the self, I'm suggesting here, that is exactly what you're trying to extirpate. . . you are trying to extirpate weakness.) So I was saying that was my idea. Now let me put this new notion into that. The notion here is that what you are reacting to in part, in this revenge, an emotion that fuels it I should say and that leads to the need for revenge, is, of course, initially a sense of narcissistic injury from somebody or other, from situations which you are not able to respond to directly. The need to scapegoat is part. . . is what fuels this passion of revenge. . . because you submitted, you SHAME feel guilty and ashamed that you were cowardly, you had to be prudent, you had to be calculating, it didn't pay to lash out at the person who actually offended you. And that shame and guilt has to be relieved somehow. Ah, and that's Franz Alexander's point as interpreted by Kohut. . . but what he doesn't say is that. . . What has to be relieved has to be relieved basically against first a scapegoat. . . because the initial premise is that you had to inhibit your action against the initial aggressor. . . so it's going to be against a scapegoat. . . that's the first point. My point, I think earlier, fits in here. Why is a weak person chosen as this target as the scapegoat? Prudential reasons could account for it but they don't seem to do it. They're chosen because it is precisely weakness that must be attacked. It is weakness that is evil that lead to your shameful cowardice your inhibition and so forth. And weakness outside is punishable, it's

*forbade you to rebel initially*  
*and you convince, you interpret sense of sin, guilt, shame, who*  
*What you are and's revenge on your own submission, your*  
*weak self that (betrayed you - your ego-ideal, ideal self-image)*  
*"initial attack, provocation, insult"*

*All Right!*



evil. . .by doing so you are demonstrating your toughness to yourself and to the world. . .now, a quote that I've been looking for ever since in print. . .but I remember the words, I just like to have them in print. . .was about two months ago in the "New York Times" a description of a massacre in Guatamala, a typical massacre where people were simply impressed from a village and would go to another village and kill all the women and children, all the men were again.

Brenman-Gibson: What kind of gangs?

Ellsberg: (inaudible) They were picked up, you know, we're recruiting you to come along and do this, deputizing you. . . come along and do this and the words were. . .now we're going to find out if you are truly men and what was it they were being asked to do? Men's work. . .well first only men do this, but on the other hand not every man can do it. It takes a real man to be willing to do what must be done even kill little children. . .and they went over there and did that. In other words toughness. . .there is. . .you know it's not a stereotype exactly that it's man's work to kill children but in certain situations that is presented as a natural thing that has to be done. This is what it's analogized to: hard work. Hard moral work. Hard emotional work. You show you're strong by doing whatever has to be done. . .even killing people. We know you as a normal person wouldn't want to kill them (inaudible) quote that I put up each of here has seen. . .to the S.S. generals. . .each has seen the bodies a hundred corpses, five hundred corpses, and we have seen these things and with a few exceptions, caused by human weakness, have remained decent. That is our triumph, that's also translated. . .That has made us hard or that has made us tough.

Man: (inaudible) identifying one's own weakness somewhere else, the black, the woman, the Jew, the lower class person.

This is the standard response from the men in charge of the Minutemen in North Dakota who showed about their "feelings" or moral compunction.

A central theme: "Man's love is but a thing apart. 'Tis woman's whole existence" (WORK gives MAN this "Centrality")

Ellsberg: Yeah. Okay, now the caveat. . . the real paradox which none of these people. . . they only report they don't explain it all. Part of it is ah, they all report, is a lack of overall restraint.

Brenman-Gibson: You're saying this?

*Simple* || Ellsberg: No, this is Horney, they're all saying that. An aspect of this process. . . she describes it as what happens if you don't have a good restraining social process (inaudible) They look more at the unrestrained revenge. The key to this is one turns aside, one ignores Horney's not quite right. . . you don't leave out all calculation. . . she suggests you leave out all calculation. . . you don't leave out all calculation. As he puts out you do brilliant systematic calculation of how to kill other people. . . so what you is any calculation of what will happen to you in the course of this. That's what seems strange, || that's what makes it look out of control. But strictly speaking, it's a rather controlled process. But from the point of view of the narrow self, not the grandiose self, the existing physical body, you're going to get killed as a result of this. And this you don't pay attention enough. My first intuitive reaction when I read that was. . . as I said to you. . . they're not just drawing attention to the fact that this doesn't just happen by going out of control but that one deliberately ignores those calculations because it would be undignified, unworthy, under these circumstances to worry about what happens to me or what happens to the enemy or what happens to third parties. Now an explanation of that from Alexander, in fact. If an intermediate stage in this process is a feeling that at some point in this change in this advance, one had been inhibited, by what, by calculations *6* said what would happen to you if you kicked mommy, if you kicked the boss or if you did something. If this is the result of the shame that has to be *extricated?* extricated, the shame



which we remember is an injury itself. If that is to be extirpated, precisely what must be overthrown is the kind of calculation that inhibited you last time. (applause) . . . that defined you as ~~your~~ weak, subordinate, submissive, compliant, weakling, infantile, etc. Then you've got to show in another situation. . . By God, you know, I'm going to kill these children even if I'm executed for it, you know, whatever.

Man: And it also means then, that if there's a first strike a second strike is inevitable. *of course*

Ellsberg: Connelley came in to oppose Kissinger on this point, he said, (inaudible) slap the table, something only Connelley could do. He slapped the table, he said, Mr. President, if you don't do this you will be perceived as a weakling. And then Haldeman comments. . . "Connelley really knew how to stick it to ~~them~~ <sup>him</sup>." *(from Hersh?)*

Man: Do you think this is a fatal flaw in our structure of government? (inaudible) or a committee closer to equals. . .

Ellsberg: Do you know where that's true? Russia. The other side of that. . . everybody who's commented on dealing with the Russians, including presidents, they all mention it in their memoirs. . . that when they deal in summits. *they are* secretaries of state. . . everybody who deals at a high level says ~~there~~ <sup>since, of course, Stalin</sup> astounded to realize that none of the leaders <sup>has</sup> had the leeway to make decisions that a president does. They are convinced that it's not just a show that's being put on, it's a necessity to consult with several others, you see there's one guy nominally on top but the collegial aspect of that which seems to involve at least six or seven others. They really do. . . it slows everything up and they can't make a move as fast as we can. . . but they really struck that gee (?) (inaudible) without apologizing to anybody. . . on his own right away always have to be consulted with in Russia. That seems to be since Stalin.

*part of what Reagan calls their "Mickey-Mouse" society*

Brenman-Gibson: Do you think that's inherent in our structure of government or do you think. . . I thought you thought. . . *(Ceding Power to the Executive Office)*

Ellsberg: It's enormously increased, almost year by year, but one thing in general, by the way, I wrote in the (inaudible) when I described the state of mind of this person who cannot afford to be weak who must guard his resources, must guard his image and so forth, this is a war time. . . he sees himself as being at war all the time. The fact is that what the cold war was was a prolongation of wartime executives <sup>power?</sup> into peacetime. In which then, the Congress' authority was enormously diminished and the President's was enormously increased and that's what's kept going and, of course all the factors had wanted that favored the hostility with Russia which justified it. . . we've got to allow. . . the secrecy. . . prolongation into peacetime which is normally only a wartime phenomena. You could work that out in a thousand (inaudible) and that's a simple reality. But it's also interesting that. . .

*Oh boy.*

Brenman-Gibson: Then that could be seized back by a congress if they understood what's going on, is that right?

Ellsberg: D and others, even going back to the earliest stages of the American Constitution, a lot of people had commented that in fact this isn't well known among Americans, but foreigners know this, that the American president, even in the constitution, is given powers that are possessed by almost no other monarch in the world and that's especially true in war time under war time (inaudible).

Brenman-Gibson: John Adams failed us.

Ellsberg: Well, no they wanted to hold him back in certain respects.



3/29/84

Tape 2

That was the key thing here, you see, Congress' power to declare war and to raise arms was a totally explicit attempt to limit the power that George III. had had. They did not want that. They weren't by the way worried about George III particularly so much. It was George III's cabinet, the administrators, the bureaucracy. They really thought themselves throughout most of the war, what they were worried about was not domination by George III but by domination by executive government, by domination <sup>of</sup> in Parliament, you see.

Brenman-Gibson: So why weren't there more limits put into the structure?

Ellsberg: So they did put, not they did this limit. The war thing was thought out very much. . .we must not allow the president, the commander in chief the power to appropriate money for armies or to declare war. So the erosion of that leads to a point now that was perceived then in the critique after Vietnam. . .that in fact, the power that the president had in effect acquired with the erosion of Congress' control over this stuff was now a power that no other head of state really in the world had, concentrated in one mass, and was the (inaudible) founders of the Constitution had tried to avert. (inaudible) had gotten complicated back in the (inaudible) and so you get this kind of concentrate. . .(inaudible) and the point of separation of (inaudible) . Today. . .in the paper today, the Congress is trying. . .the Congress has decided that the. . .the War Powers Act . . .weak as it is, (inaudible) to the Supreme Court for a decision. (inaudible)

Man: (inaudible good idea because it's not (inaudible)

Brenman-Gibson: He wants it constitutionally (inaudible) he should have more.

Ellsberg: Well, does this. . .

Man: (inaudible the governments of the world, but it's ah. . .they don't

solicit (inaudible).

Brenman-Gibson: Oh, that's hard to do.

Ellsberg: Well, okay, if you want to. . . a definition of what the task is, well, okay, all right, let me, you know you said what should we do talk about the freeze, quick freeze, moratorium, no first (inaudible) comprehensive (inaudible) various things, talk about legislative strategies, trying to oppose intervention--that's a much tougher one--trying to abandon imperial role in general--much tougher, examining the question which the world policy (inaudible) is doing, Jerry Sanders is executive director of that. . . ah, research director. The World Policy Institute is at last examining a question that should have been done twenty years ago. . . What after all are the costs of renouncing imperial rights and responsibilities in the world of intervention? What would be suffered in the way of resources and prices?

Brenman-Gibson: A good idea of economic costs.

Ellsberg: All economics. . . no, no, various kinds, and what could be done to alleviate those by restructuring our society and how could that be done? To give one example. . . (inaudible) priorities pointed out. If you took the money for the MX. . . they were looking at the MX. . . looked at quite conservatively. . . if you took 20 billion and used it to and to subsidize insulation (inaudible) you would. . . you would eliminate the U.S. need for oil from the Middle East which is. . . and that's an example of the kinds of. . . (inaudible)

Man: 20 Billion dollars?

Ellsberg: Well, just to subsidize insulation. They had in mind doing a lot of other things to do with that. . . but among other things. . . for that amount of money you could. . . see, people talk about what's popular to me socially. . . they oddly, this by the way, my wife often raised this



point, used these terms. . .now you people are finally picking it up. . . she's a director of the um. . .one of the people on the World Policy Committee. . .this simple question. . .people say, what would it cost to. . .would it be hard or easy to make certain kinds of changes, industrial policy, retraining, abolish hunger, and they don't look at the cost in the light of the kind of money we spend on defense, you know, allegedly for the same purpose in theory allowing. . .you know. . . trying to maintain that. . .what could you do if you had a hundred billion dollars. . .two hundred billion. . .three hundred billion. . . you know that's what you're talking about a yearly budget well let's say you don't want to abolish it all. . .take a hundred billion dollars what could you do with that? Well, you could do quite a bit with a hundred billion dollars. . .okay, so that's what I was leading to. That is the larger question. No. So here is the hopeful thing. . .

Man: (inaudible) Sounds like (inaudible) education and conscious raising (inaudible)

Ellsberg: Oh no. Did I say confident. . .Oh God. . .(inaudible)

Man: (inaudible) I'm sure it's accurate. . .is that in the public realm on a larger scale men work out their worst qualities, the worst sides of themselves because the mind is (inaudible)

Ellsberg: Well, you know, by the way, it ties into something I did (inaudible) . . .If you've read. . .have you read The Catcher, the ? implication in that is that organizations and people. . .if you look at an organization as an entity or as an organism or as an individual um, as I've been saying already. . .he suggests it's not unlike an individual but the kind of individual it's like is a rather kind of special individual. . .a very regressed individual, relatively regressed in a

a number of ways. . .in its intellection and its use of information. . .  
and specifically in its aggressivness. . .that it's an unusually  
aggressive and I think, by the way. . .Freud, I think they would say  
Freud started with the analysis of crowds in particular and so forth.  
And the basic notion of that. . .who's the guy who did the crowd work?  
La . And the basic notion there was not that an organization  
is a total entity that it's like an individual but it's like a ah, a  
wild, angry, unrestrained and aggressive individual, regressed  
individual and I think what we can say that if we looked at states  
here we're seeing that peculiar type of individual and it's very like  
interestingly the individuals who are described here. These are paranoid  
types or shame-prone or revenge-prone type of individual. And one could  
see how that might be changed and whatnot, but here's how it might be  
changed with individuals and I think that might be true of countries.  
If we're to change any of this stuff, Mike C said in a quote I  
used earlier, he focuses very much on the need to change our intervention  
policies, the nuclear weapons are not really likely to go off.

Brenman-Gibson: Who is he?

Ellsberg: Klare. He is one of the best analysts of. . .in particular  
of non-nuclear arms race and arms sale (inaudible) He said in a  
conference once, a rather mouthful of a sentence but I thought it was  
very good. . .Our task is to delegitimize the cultural hegemony of  
militarism. But needless to say to attack, to subvert, to (inaudible)  
If you're not familiar by the way using the word hegemony in the sense  
of Gramsci ~~of grouchy, of grouchy~~, explaining the lack of revolution in theory in  
Italy and other places after WWI. (inaudible) had the Italian Communist  
Party quite deviant and modified form. . .much is involved in prison  
which emphasized the rule of the ruling class is maintained not just by



obvious elements of power but by the cultural elements of <sup>hegemony</sup> ? . By whole culture of ideological influences through the schools, the churches, the unions, everything, they permeated society, they essentially dominated the values and the preconceptions and assumptions of society.

Brenman-Gibson: Does this guy have a book, Klare? What's the book. Say that phrase, will you.

Ellsberg: To delegitimize the cultural <sup>hegemony</sup> of militarism. One nice thing about that was first that it's a task that everybody can do. In fact, my seven year old could contribute to that though he isn't likely to, I'll tell you, he's the one who has to be worked over (laughter) Well no I live with that on the assumption because that it is perhaps phase-<sup>appropriate</sup> (inaudible) in the hopes that it will go away. But it does seem somehow right for a seven year old to have these attitudes.

Brenman-Gibson: What worries you, and properly so, is that the society also at this point of history is not bringing antedotes to that and if antedotes are not (inaudible) we're sunk.

Ellsberg: But this is a task that everybody that everybody can do almost in their immediate area, in schools and everywhere. Because a large part of the problem we're facing, not just the super-structural part or some lower subordinate manipulative part but a key part is an entire culture and ideology that legitimates these ways of thinking and behaving and so forth. Now. . .

Brenman-Gibson: May I say in personal transactions as well as in, you know, larger social issues and so forth. And I think that this is the place if we're going to evolve, if we have time, God knows we don't. But if we had time, if we're going to evolve a different state of human consciousness which is common to men and women then it seems to me that

this delegitimizing of the cultural . I would only substitute for the word militarism, adversarial relationships.

Ellsberg: I don't know. . .I wouldn't actually. . .by the way. . .that's going a lot further.

Brenman-Gibson: Well, let's say primarily adversarial relationships.

Ellsberg: Militarism has two aspects. It sees the world exclusively in adversarial times, exclusively. . .and sees the conduct of adversarial relations in military terms. . .organized violence. . .but that's not just adversarial. . .you can be adversarial. . .Ghandi.

Brenman-Gibson: Oh all right. . .adversarial to be solved by force or violence. . .no that's different you're right, I stand corrected. Why are you smiling? I want to know what you just thought.

Woman: Well, as far as the judicial system goes I agree with you to a certain extent (inaudible) and beyond reason. (inaudible)

Brenman-Gibson: Your average rotten vicious divorce case, right. Would you agree?

Ellsberg: You're not rejecting entirely the idea of adversarial proceedings, or are you?

Woman: I don't think that it's possible. I don't think that we're such negotiators that we can sit down and start that close. . .something that would be acceptable.

Ellsberg: I think Ghandi in recent (inaudible) her understanding of is very good. That she sees human conflict as virtually inevitable.

Brenman-Gibson: Violent is the word.

Man: (inaudible) does is in triumph. (inaudible)



Brenman-Gibson: One wins and one loses.

Ellsberg: He didn't like court proceedings. He wanted a better method in court. Okay. Here's what (inaudible) defines the task in a way that is recognizable but it tells us where to go as a nation I think. . . he's talking about individuals. . . why is it hard to get a person to change this way of life which is very empty, feelings of. . . the revengeful way, right. . . the alternative to a vindictive way of life. . . as he said earlier. . . the vindictive life appears more appealing. . . he starts that the notion that the only alternative to this way is to be dominated weak, poor, pitiful. . . you then have to give him a sense that there is an alternative way of being that is neither vindictive nor weak and dominated and subordinate. He may know people who seem strong without being vindictive but they are too far removed from his own world of puzzling (inaudible) When it finally does dawn on him that there is a constructive way out, his reactions are mixed. He would like to have all this, as in therapy. . . he would like to have all the benefits of being constructive, the peace of mind, the inner freedom, the emotional alivement, but the road toward these goods does not seem at all appealing. To begin with, it would entail much work. . . work with his pride, his externalization--the idea really comes from outside-- and all the factors entailed in this human relations. But if need be he would do the work if it were not for one deterring factor. Taking this road would mean, heaven forbid, of becoming more human. It would mean giving up his isolated grandeur, his uniqueness, becoming an ordinary human being like everybody else without any special privileges. Becoming part of the swarming mass of humanity he so despises, to have limitations, to feel sorry. . . to have tolerance, sympathy, and last but not least, to assume

responsibility--not in the grand style of playing providence for others, but to start with just for his own life. All of this seems like a distasteful comedown and it does take some reorientation, quite some reorientation to reverse his values and until just as becoming human will feel like the most desirable goal toward which to strive. Until that time, the healthy alternative too is a danger to guard against and thereby rather adds to the rigid holding on to vindictiveness. I'm saying that we must in effect combat nonviolently (laughter) delegitimize the (inaudible) those tendencies in our society starting with presidential pronouncements which dig into us this country is unique, is wholly superior in every respect, has thereby both responsibilities to run the world and privileges that go with those responsibilities. Um. . . that is not to be compared to any of these other things and so forth. . . the responsibilities of power that we talk about and to begin to recognize that we have as you said, limitations, if it's an individual that happens to be recognized, a country can recognize that. . . limitations, lack of responsibility, and a lack of right to infringe on other people's rights.

Man: (inaudible) was trying to do (inaudible).

Ellsberg: He was trying to do. The phrase that I hate, I must say, it occurs to me is the one context that it is appropriate, the notion of psychoanalysts--head shrinker. But in this particular sense it is shrinking the sense of the grandiose self, you know has both the entitlement and is so prone to human relation and so forth. . . I'll tell you, you and Martha were both present yesterday, I don't know if you both heard this. . . I had one guy who was denouncing me after my lecture, what he tried. . . he said do you want the Communists to win in El Salvador? and I said I do not believe we have a right to kill people in El Salvador and I believe we should stop paying other people to kill them, it's not



our right, we should not intervene. He said will not the Communists take over? I said, it so happens that it would be very hard for the Communists to be as bad or worse than the people we're supporting right now. It's not quite impossible. You know there's always somebody worse it turns out (inaudible) but the strong liklihood that they would not be worse that in any case it was not our business to choose between these factions in El Salvador and then his response was. . . he interpreted that as meaning, though I carefully. . . I said, it's not for me as an American or for you to decide who should be in the government in El Salvador, this by the way. . .

Man: What was the setting for this?

Ellsberg: A lecture I gave. His response was interesting. I thought it was emotional because he was first by infering, that I preferred Communism to what he called a pro-American rule which is to say, actually, that somebody who is pro American excuses anything. I mean if he excuses those guys then he excuses anything. You don't have to be anything but pro American. . . you can be (inaudible) if you're pro American. Ah. . . that shames America, to say that that's pro American so what it means is subordinate, you see. . . thought it would be better in effect to be (inaudible) than to be independent (inaudible) So, first point for me to say that we withdraw, is to say that I prefer the consequences which has the . . . assumption that, I don't think he was able to hear my rejection of his point. It has to be something that we do. . . are responsible and have a right to feel responsible for what happens. Therefore, if we choose to get out, we are, if we do not evolve ourselves that is just a way of exercising our responsibilities

(inaudible) of what he was drawing. That he was just reflecting the point of view that it's our business whatever happens. If you prefer Communist rule to a pro American rule, you should not live in America, not be an American. Now I'm saying that is the precise rejection of the notion that we live in this country, we are not El Salvadorians, it is neither our right or in the end, really our power to decide ultimately forever who rules there. We have no right. We in fact, have been quite wrong in doing. . .all of the perceptions which are like an individual doing what she wants to learn. For us to learn as a country. Many Americans have learned that, and in fact, it's not even after Vietnam impossible for a presidential candidate to suggest that which is encouraging. It's also noticable if the other presidential candidate doesn't feel free to say that. . .Mondale and of course, Reagan. Ah, on the contrary, it's holding up to americans the notion that we have the power to run the world, unlimited power, there are no real limits on our power. . .and therefore the responsibility. . .they go together. If you have the power you have the responsibility and have the right. We do not worry about this, nor need anyone else worry about our exercise of that because, after all, we are not perhaps perfect but better than anyone else, we're the best. We make mistakes but your best bet is to follow our lead. You should do what we say, follow our instincts, you go along we're strong. Our instincts are very are better than anyone elses so we need not apologize for our shortcomings, we just try to improve them but when it comes to really power, we have no right to yield influence to anyone else because the presumption that our policy, our goals are better than anyone elses. That's the conception that he's holding out and it's a very appealing conception and above all attravtive to people



who, living in an industrial society, living in the 1980's, living in America, or any other country, have enough humiliations they have lived with since nine months, since 14 years and since 20 and every fucking day of their lives which they have no way of working out. It was very attractive to them to say, as a member of this nation we assure that <sup>you</sup> you will get satisfaction. That insults to the (inaudible) by God, will be repaid tenfold. They may not be repaid in (inaudible) but you can stand tall quote Reagan - The marines are standing tall now. As I said on the air (inaudible) he said after (inaudible) he said now we can stand tall. It was when the marines were still in (inaudible) I said maybe bunkers have gotten a lot taller than they were when I was in the marine corps, I have a feeling there's a lot of marines in Lebanon that (inaudible) to stand tall. (laughter)

Man: (inaudible) just the opposite of that for a black population it's the most humiliating. (inaudible) central American and (audible) what the psychology there is.

Ellsberg: Well, let me suggest right away. (inaudible) identify with the United States of America imperial role. They're not part. They typically do not feel pride (inaudible) By the way, the other.

Man: But he's saying identify with the victims of America because you are victims of America. He could say let's give those suckers what they're worth (inaudible)

Ellsberg: Not likely because it's mostly black and brown and yellow.

Man: Well look at emergence in Irish in Moslom (inaudible).

(laughter) I'd really like you to expand a little bit, I really like the way you define what the task is but I'd like to know more about how to get there in terms of (inaudible) about raising consciousness.

*a little  
more to come  
(not much)*

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(laughter)

Ellsberg: We didn't. Yeah, well, true. That's why I (inaudible)

Brenman-Gibson: No but you know, I was just thinking that. . .I wonder what is the task? And it couldn't be the individual. If one had all the implementation, all the money, all the power to do it, what do you want to do, what do you want to change. How can one invent, as it were, a social invention that would allow such a person, who is a representative (inaudible) after all, they elected Reagan. How can one allow such a representative of Americans to have have (inaudible) and enacting all of these humiliations that are (inaudible) talking about men now more than women. . .there are differences, we can't go into it now, I don't believe, gender differences.

Ellsberg: (inaudible) answer to that by the way, and I think other (inaudible)

Brenman-Gibson: I don't want to focus on the gender differences.

Ellsberg: You do want to?

Brenman-Gibson: No I wasn't saying (inaudible) misses the point. On the men thing she says that, and it's related to this, see this has to do with being able to feel strong without this (unsure) with a vengeful, national persona. But she didn't say national, without vengeful, and I would say without identification with a powerful military power. . .um, and one major aspect is to allow people to have far more experiences in their daily life of being powerful together in their communities, in their work, in their unions or whatever, you know in their groups in political activities. That has to do with it. You know people get almost a euphoria and over-exaggerated idea of what is to be achieved, but when they realize they can achieve something when they would have said before trying the experiences they couldn't achieve anything. So experiences



then of having effect on your daily life, and of course of politics as well.

end